

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 06BOGOTA11428, AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES WEALTH TAX, HUMAN RIGHTS WITH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06BOGOTA11428**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06BOGOTA11428	2006-12-21 21:12	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Bogota

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/wikileaks/articulo-262615-enredos-empresa-israeli>

VZCZCXYZ0000  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1428/01 3552112  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 212112Z DEC 06  
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1518  
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 8547  
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC 8441  
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 4606  
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 9851  
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 5264  
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 2222  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0520  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 011428

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Santos said the GOC would use the recently enacted &wealth tax<sup>8</sup> to fund items that would have an immediate impact in the war against terrorist groups. He asked the U.S. to advise the GOC on how best to spend these funds; the Ambassador agreed to do so. Santos said the GOC was considering possible Israeli help with its High-Value Target program, and would receive a formal proposal in January. The Ambassador said we shared the concerns of the International Red Cross and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding alleged extra-judicial killings by military personnel. Santos said the GOC planned to transfer authority over the military justice system from the Defense Ministry to the civilian judiciary to give it greater transparency. He reiterated the GOC commitment to continue aerial spraying along the Ecuadorian border despite GOE protests. End Summary

¶2. (C) The Ambassador met Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos and Vice Minister Sergio Jaramillo on December 16 to present the U.S. response to the GOC's proposed strategic framework agreement (reported reftel), review security issues, and highlight human rights concerns.

-----  
GOC Seeks U.S. Help on Optimizing Use of the Wealth Tax  
-----

¶3. (C) Santos said the Defense Ministry needed help to decide how best to spend the revenue it would receive from the recently enacted &wealth tax.<sup>8</sup> The different military services had prepared &wish lists<sup>8</sup> of priority items; it was difficult for the civilians in the Ministry to evaluate these requests. He did not want to spend the proceeds on capital items that required long delivery times. President Uribe regularly stressed that the GOC only has forty-three months to achieve his goals. The emphasis would be on operational costs or capital goods that would have an immediate impact in the war against illegal armed groups. &We don't want to buy toys,<sup>8</sup> he stressed. Santos said he had asked the U.S. to evaluate Colombia's air defense needs when the GOC was considering buying the Super Tucano. He had benefited greatly from U.S. input. He asked the Ambassador if the U.S. would provide similar guidance on how to use the &wealth tax<sup>8</sup> proceeds.

¶4. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. would be glad to help. He agreed the GOC should focus on its internal conflict which meant giving priority to operational and sustainment costs. Capital expenditures should be focused on internal threats and look for the most cost-effective\*as opposed to most technologically advanced\*solutions. He assured Santos that in providing our assessment, the U.S would be objective.

-----  
Possible Israeli Involvement in High-Value-Target Program  
-----

¶5. (C) Santos said the GOC was considering possible Israeli assistance with its High-Value-Target program, and asked that the information be held closely. Three senior, retired Israeli officials, including a former Mossad official, recently visited Colombia and would present a formal proposal to the GOC in January. Vice Defense Minister Jaramillo added that while the Colombian military had developed strong tactical skills, it had failed to build effective systems. He thought the Israelis would be helpful in this regard.

¶6. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. would not object to an Israeli role, but noted that the environment in Israel was different from that of Colombia. For example, the Israelis had better operational security.

-----  
The Military and Human Rights  
-----

¶7. (C) The Ambassador said we shared the concerns raised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) regarding alleged military involvement in extra-judicial killings. It was key that the GOC investigate and punish any military personnel

responsible for such crimes in a timely, transparent way.

¶8. (C) Santos agreed the GOC must act quickly to punish military involved in human rights violations. He had recently met with ICRC representative Barbara Hintermann and UNCHR representative Juan Pablo Corlazzoli to discuss these issues, and would follow up with them in the future. Santos said President Uribe had met with the military High Command the week of December 2 at the Casa Narino and had stressed the need for the military to punish human rights violators. Santos said he had also proposed that authority over the military justice system be transferred from the Defense Ministry to the civilian judicial system. This would give the military justice system greater transparency and credibility. After some initial resistance, he said the senior military commanders had accepted this reform.

-----  
Spraying and the Ecuadorian Border  
-----

¶9. (C) The Ambassador praised the GOC decision to resume aerial spraying of illegal coca cultivation along the Ecuadorian border. Regarding the sharp reaction from the GOE, Santos said the GOC stance was to be &humble but firm8 regarding the decision. He had spoken with his Ecuadorian counterpart who had taken the news in stride; it was Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Francisco Carrion who was taking a hard line over the issue. Santos thanked the Ambassador for information that the U.S. had provided on the safety of glyphosate and the spray program; it would be invaluable in dealing with the media.

WOOD

=====CABLE ENDS=====